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Abstract—As illustrated in recent years (Superstorm
Sandy, the Northeast Ice Storm of 1998, etc.), extreme
weather events pose an enormous threat to the electric power
transmission systems and the associated socio-economic sys-
tems that depend on reliable delivery of electric power.
Besides inevitable malfunction of power grid components, de-
liberate malicious attacks can cause high risks to the service.
These threats motivate the need for approaches and methods
that improve the resilience of power systems. In this paper,
we develop a model and tractable methods for optimizing
the upgrade of transmission systems through a combination
of hardening existing components, adding redundant lines,
switches, generators, and FACTS and phase-shifting devices.
While many of these controllable components are included
in traditional design (expansion planning) problems, we
uniquely assess their benefits from a resiliency point of
view. More importantly, perhaps, we evaluate the suitability
of using state-of-the-art AC power flow relaxations versus
the common DC approximation in resilience improvement
studies. The resiliency model and algorithms are tested on a
modified version of the RTS-96 (single area) system.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE modern electrical system is designed for trans-portation of large amounts of power from sources of
supply to distant points of demand. Within these systems,
the underlying high-voltage transmission networks play
a vital role in achieving this mission. However, when
transmission networks are exposed to extreme event con-
ditions, the ability to deliver power is degraded because
of physical damage to overhead transmission lines and
towers. One example of such events are ice storms. During
an ice storm, transmission towers can fail due to leg
buckling and lines can fail due to the combined stress
of ice accumulation and wind [1], [2], [3].
When such events occur on large scales, outages and
impacts can be extreme. For example, in the winter of
1998, an ice storm in northeastern North America toppled
over 1000 transmission towers and 30,000 wooden utility
poles. Over 5 million people were without power and the
economic impacts were estimated at $2.6 billion [4]. Thus,
given the potential social and economic impacts of these
events, it is important to consider how to upgrade the de-
sign of transmission systems to improve their performance
under these conditions.
In our preliminary work [5], we formulated the Optimal
Resilient Grid Design problem for Transmission systems
(ORGDT) as a two-stage mixed-integer stochastic opti-
mization problem and developed an algorithm to solve
this problem. The first stage selects from a set of potential
upgrades to the network. The second stage evaluates the
network performance benefit of the upgrades with a set of
damage scenarios sampled from a stochastic distribution
of events of concern. One of the important questions that
was unanswered in this early work centered on the use of
recently developed convex relaxations of AC power flow
physics [6] in resiliency planning. Here, we address this
concern and convincingly show that using DC approxima-
tion of power flow physics leads to severely suboptimal
and infeasible solutions under certain operating conditions
of the grid. These results establish the necessity of using
models of AC physics in resilient design problems and
analysis.
Like [5], we adopt the methods discussed in [3] in
order to sample realistic damage scenarios for transmis-
sion systems. The ORGDT upgrade options include: a)
Build new lines, b) Build switches, FACTS devices and
Phase-shifting transformers (PST) to provide operational
flexibility, c) Harden existing lines to lower the proba-
bility of damage, and d) Build new generation facilities.
Minimal network (resiliency) performance is measured by
satisfying a minimum fraction of critical and non-critical
loads. We use the exact algorithms developed in [5] to
compare solutions found using the DC approximation and
the convex quadratic relaxations of [6].
Literature Review Our recent paper [5] is the most
closely related work. This paper develops the ORGDT
model and algorithm used here and is based on the
resilient distribution system design work developed in [7].
Another important area of related work is interdiction
modeling and optimization. Here, the goal is to operate
or design a system to make it as resilient as possible
to an adversary who can damage up to k elements [8],
[9], [10], [11]. These models are a generalization of our
model when k is chosen to bound a worst-case event.
However, given their min-max structure, these models
are computationally challenging and are solvable only for
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2small k. Instead, we exploit the probabilistic nature of the
adversary and we are able to address larger problems. In
addition, existing interdiction models also do not generally
include AC physics. Closely related to interdiction and
our model is reference [12]. They develop a model for
hardening and upgrading transmission systems that is
resilient to all possible physical damages bounded by a
certain budget (i.e. weighted k). Instead of developing
an attacker-defender model as in interdiction modeling,
they include each possible damage as a scenario (like
our model). Given the combinatorial number of possible
scenarios, they develop heuristics for reducing the number
of scenarios that are included. Unlike our approach, they
focus only on the DC approximation and leave the de-
velopment of decomposition algorithms for future work.
A third area of related work is stochastic transmission
and generation expansion planning, where a recent survey
describes some of the state-of-the-art [13].
Overall, most papers in network design and expansion
planning use the linearized DC model and few studies
consider FACTS devices and PSTs, although they may
have significant benefits. Some notable exceptions include
the use of PSTs in network expansion [14], which uses a
genetic algorithm over the DC model. See also the recent
work in [15] for the optimal placement of these devices
to avoid congestion.
The key contributions of this paper include:
• A detailed case study and extensions of the ORGDT
model (from [5]) that compares DC approximation
based solutions and solutions based on state-of-the-
art AC power flow relaxations.
• An approach for recovering AC feasible solutions
from solutions found using the DC approximation
and AC relaxations.
• A detailed expansion model with appropriate gener-
ator capacity modeling, FACTS devices and PST de-
vices, and cutting-plane-based algorithmic enhance-
ments that was omitted from [5].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section
II we describe the ORGDT model. Section III describes
our decomposition algorithms and Section IV our case
studies. We conclude with Section V.
II. ORGDT OPTIMIZATION MODEL
NOMENCLATURE
Parameters and notation
N set of nodes (buses)
E set of edges (lines and transformers)
S set of disaster scenarios
Ds set of edges that are inoperable during s ∈ S
i imaginary number constant
| . | absolute value of the input argument
cxij cost to build a line (i,j) if the line does not already exist
cτij cost to build a switch on line (i,j)
ctij cost to harden a line (i,j)
cδij cost to build a FACTS device on line (i,j)
cγij cost to build a PST device on line (i,j)
czpi cost of real generation capacity at bus i
cui cost to build a generation facility at bus i
Tij apparent power thermal limit on line (i,j)
L set of buses whose loads are critical
Gij + iBij admittance of line (i,j)
G¯ij + iB¯ij modified admittance of line (i,j) due to top transformer
Rij + iXij impedance of line (i,j)
Rij + iX¯ij modified impedance of line (i,j) due to top transformer
θu phase angle difference limit
θM big-M value on phase angle difference limit
φu phase shift limit
vli, v
u
i lower and upper bound on voltage at bus i, respectively
dpi + idqi AC power demand at bus i
gpui + igq
u
i max. existing AC generation capacity at bus i
zpui + izq
u
i max. AC generation capacity that can be built at bus i
lpcr + ilqcr fraction of critical AC power loads that must be served
lpncr + ilqncr fraction of non-critical AC power loads that must be
served
Binary variables
xij determines if line (i,j) is built
τij determines if line (i,j) has a switch built
tij determines if line (i,j) is hardened
ui determines the generation capacity built at bus i
δij determines if FACTS device is built on line (i,j)
γij determines if PST device is built on line (i,j)
xsij determines if line (i,j) is used during disaster s ∈ S
τsij determines if switch (i,j) is used during disaster s ∈ S
tsij determines if line (i,j) is hardened during disaster s ∈ S
δsij determines if FACTS device on line (i,j) is used during
disaster s ∈ S
γsij determines if PST device on line (i,j) is used during
disaster s ∈ S
Continuous variables
θsi phase angle at bus i during disaster s ∈ S
φsij phase angle shift introduced by PST on line ij during
disaster s ∈ S
vsi voltage at bus i during disaster s ∈ S
lsij current magnitude squared (|Isij |2) on line (i,j) during
disaster s ∈ S
psij + iq
s
ij AC power flow on line (i,j) during disaster s ∈ S
zpi + izqi determines the capacity for AC generation at bus i
zpsi + izq
s
i determines the capacity for AC generation at bus i during
disaster s ∈ S
gpsi + igq
s
i AC power generated at bus i during disaster s ∈ S
lpsi + ilq
s
i AC power load delivered at bus i during disaster s ∈ S
ypsi + iyq
s
i determines the fraction of AC power load served at bus i
during disaster s ∈ S
We formulate the ORGDT as a two-stage mixed-integer
nonlinear program, PAC0 . The first-stage variables (with-
out superscript s) specify the new infrastructure enhance-
ments and the second-stage variables (with superscript s)
describe the operation of invested infrastructure to serve
loads for each damage scenario s ∈ S.
PAC0 := min
∑
ij∈E
(
cxijxij + c
τ
ijτij + c
t
ijtij + c
δ
ijδij + c
γ
ijγij
)
+
∑
i∈N
(cui ui + c
zp
i zpi) (1a)
s.t. xsij ≤ xij ∀ij ∈ Ds, s ∈ S (1b)
xsij = xij ∀ij /∈ Ds, s ∈ S (1c)
τsij ≤ τij , tsij ≤ tij ∀ij ∈ E , s ∈ S (1d)
3δsij ≤ δij , γsij ≤ γij ∀ij ∈ E , s ∈ S (1e)
zpsi ≤ zpi, zqsi ≤ zqi ∀i ∈ N , s ∈ S (1f)
0 ≤ zpi ≤ zpui ui, |zqi| ≤ zqui ui ∀i ∈ N (1g)
zpi ≥ 2|zqi| ∀i ∈ N (1h)
(xs, τ s, ts, δs,γs, zps, zqs,u) ∈ QAC(s) ∀s ∈ S
(1i)
xij , τij , tij , δij , γij , ui ∈ {0, 1} ∀ij ∈ E , i ∈ N
(1j)
In PAC0 , Eq. (1a) minimizes the total upgrade cost, which
includes new lines, switches, hardening, FACTS, phase
shifters, generators and real power capacity, respectively.
Constraints (1b)-(1f) link the first-stage (construction)
decisions with second-stage variables in QAC(s). Con-
straints (1g) and (1h) model generation capacity upgrades.
Without loss of generality, reactive power capacity is
limited to half of the real power capacity. Constraint (1h)
ensures that the generators are not built purely for reactive
power support. Constraint (1i) states that the mixed-integer
vector (xs, τ s, ts, δs,γs, zps, zqs,u) ∈ QAC(s) is an
AC feasible transmission network for scenario s subject
to the constraints of QAC(s).
The constraints of QAC(s) describe the AC-power flow
equations and budget constraints on resiliency options.
Ohm’s law is modeled in constraints (2)-(5). For a given
topology of the network. x˜s, flow on line ij is forced
to zero when x˜sij = 0. Kirchhoff’s current law (flow
conservation) is given in constraints (12) and (13). Con-
straints (9)-(11) model the connection between current
magnitude (lsij) and the power loss equations as discussed
in [16]. Operational constraints (14)-(17) represent the
thermal limits, phase angle difference limits and voltage
bounds, respectively. Constraint (19) models the damaged
lines of the scenario s ∈ S, i.e., a line is inoperable
when damaged and unhardened. Constraint (20) defines
the topology for scenario s. A switch is available for
operation only if the line is active. Constraints (22) bound
the real and reactive power capacities that can be built
(if ui = 1) at bus i ∈ N . Constraints in (23) and (24)
represent total real and reactive power capacities including
the existing generators of the network. Finally, constraint
(25) captures the continuous power shedding subject to the
resiliency constraints in (26)-(29). User-defined resiliency
parameters (lpcr, lqcr, lpncr, lqncr) ensure that a minimum
fraction of critical and non-critical loads is served during
every damage scenario s ∈ S.
QAC(s) = {xs, τ s, ts, δs,γs, zps, zqs,u :
On/Off AC power flow equations:
psij = x˜
s
ij(G˜ijv
s2
i − G˜ijvsi vsj cos(θsij)
− B˜ijvsi vsj sin(θsij)) ∀ij ∈ E , (2)
qsij = x˜
s
ij(−B˜ijvs2i + B˜ijvsi vsj cos(θsij)
− G˜ijvsi vsj sin(θsij)) ∀ij ∈ E , (3)
psji = x˜
s
ij(G˜ijv
s2
j − G˜ijvsi vsj cos(θsij)
+ B˜ijv
s
i v
s
j sin(θ
s
ij)) ∀ij ∈ E , (4)
qsji = x˜
s
ij(−B˜ijvs2j + B˜ijvsi vsj cos(θsij)
+ G˜ijv
s
i v
s
j sin(θ
s
ij)) ∀ij ∈ E , (5)
θsij = θ
s
i − θsj + φsij ∀ij ∈ E , (6)
G˜ij = (G¯ij −Gij)δsij +Gij ∀ij ∈ E , (7)
B˜ij = (B¯ij −Bij)δsij +Bij ∀ij ∈ E , (8)
psij + p
s
ji = Rij l
s
ij ∀ij ∈ E , (9)
qsij + q
s
ji = Xij l
s
ij ∀ij ∈ E , (10)
ps2ij + q
s2
ij = l
s
ijv
s2
i ∀ij ∈ E , (11)
gpsi − lpsi =
∑
ij∈E
psij +
∑
ji∈E
psij ∀i ∈ N , (12)
gqsi − lqsi =
∑
ij∈E
qsij +
∑
ji∈E
qsij ∀i ∈ N , (13)
Operational limits and topology constraints:
psij
2 + qsij
2 ≤ x˜sijT 2ij ∀ij ∈ E , (14)
psji
2 + qsji
2 ≤ x˜sijT 2ij ∀ij ∈ E , (15)
|θsij | ≤ x˜sijθu + (1− x˜sij)θM ∀ij ∈ E , (16)
vli ≤ vsi ≤ vu ∀i ∈ N , (17)
− φuγsij ≤ φsij ≤ φuγsij ∀ij ∈ E , (18)
xsij = t
s
ij ∀ij ∈ Ds (19)
x˜sij = x
s
ij − τsij ≥ 0 ∀ij ∈ E (20)
δsij ≤ x˜sij , γsij ≤ x˜sij ∀ij ∈ E , (21)
Generation constraints ∀i ∈ N :
0 ≤ zpsi ≤ zpui ui, |zqsi | ≤ zqui ui, zpsi ≥ 2|zqsi | (22)
0 ≤ gpsi ≤ gpui + zpsi , (23)
(gqli − |zqsi |) ≤ gqsi ≤ (gqui + |zqsi |), (24)
Resilience constraints:
lpsi = yp
s
idpi, lq
s
i = yq
s
i dqi ∀i ∈ N , (25)∑
i∈L
lpsi ≥ lpcr
∑
i∈L
dpi, (26)∑
i∈N\L
lpsi ≥ lpncr
∑
i∈N\L
dpi (27)∑
i∈L
lqsi ≥ lqcr
∑
i∈L
dqi (28)∑
i∈N\L
lqsi ≥ lqncr
∑
i∈N\L
dqi (29)
xs, τ s, ts, δs,γs ∈ {0, 1}; 0 ≤ yps, yqs ≤ 1}
A. Additional Investment Options
In this paper, we also include FACTS and PST devices
and as investment options. These devices are often useful
for addressing congestion in overloaded transmission sys-
tems, a situation that can occur during major disruptions.
In addition, these devices are cost-effective [17] and
may reduce resiliency costs significantly by replacing the
need for new transmission lines or hardening the existing
damaged lines.
Series Compensators (FACTS) We model series com-
pensation with reactance reduction. As described in the
nomenclature, δsij indicates if a compensation device is
used on line ij during scenario s ∈ S . To model this
disjunction we introduce (G˜ij , B˜ij), a tuple representing
the following conditional expression:
(G˜ij , B˜ij) =
{
(G¯ij , B¯ij), if used (δsij = 1)
(Gij , Bij), otherwise (δsij = 0)
4This expression is modeled as constraints (7) and (8).
Further, this disjunction is captured in the modified power
flow equations (2)-(5). The non-convexity of this disjunc-
tion is discussed later in this section.
Phase-Shifting Transformers (PSTs) PSTs are devices
that adjust voltage phase angles. As described in the
nomenclature, γsij indicates if a phase shifter is used on
line ij during scenario s ∈ S. This disjunction is described
in the following conditional expression:
θsij =

θsi − θsj + φsij ,
− φu ≤ φsij ≤ φu.
if installed (γsij = 1),
θsi − θsj , otherwise (γsij = 0).
This expression is modeled through constraints (6) and
(18).
B. Convex Relaxations for On/Off AC Power Flow
Numerous convex relaxations of AC power flow equa-
tions have been proposed in the literature to obtain tight
lower bounds on the original nonconvex formulation.
These relaxations have various trade-offs in complexity,
quality, and performance. However, very few relaxation
methods can be applied in the context of transmission
switching problems as the addition of binary variables
increases the complexity of the problems significantly.
Hence, given the mixed-integer nature of ORGDT, which
leads to an even more complex formulation with various
resiliency options, we extend the recently developed con-
vex quadratic relaxations of the power flow equations to
ORGDT [6]. For completeness, we discuss the necessary
convex relaxations for multilinear and trigonometric ex-
pressions which appear in nonconvex constraints (2)-(5)
and (11).
Multilinear expressions Given any two variables xi,
xj ∈ [xixi]×
[
xjxj
]
, the McCormick relaxation is used to
linearize the bilinear product xixj by introducing a new
variable x̂ij ∈ 〈xi, xj〉MC . The feasible region of this
variable is defined by equations (30). This relaxation is
exact if one variable is binary [18].
x̂ij ≥ xixj + xjxi − xi xj (30a)
x̂ij ≥ xixj + xjxi − xi xj (30b)
x̂ij ≤ xixj + xjxi − xi xj (30c)
x̂ij ≤ xixj + xjxi − xi xj (30d)
Multilinear expressions of the form xixj . . . xp are re-
laxed using a sequential bilinear approach as follows:
〈〈xi, xj〉MC , . . . , xp〉MC .
Quadratic terms Given a variable xi ∈ [xixi], a second-
order conic relaxation is applied to x2i by introducing a
new variable x̂i ∈ 〈xi〉MC−q , such that,
x̂i ≥ x2i (31a)
x̂i ≤ (xi + xi)xi − xixi (31b)
By applying the above approaches and disjunctive con-
vex relaxations for the trigonometric functions with on/off
variables [6], we outer-approximate the non-convex power
flow constraints. For brevity, we focus on constraint (2)
but similar relaxations hold for constraints (3)-(5).
psij =(Gij −Gij)
(
δ̂xv
s
ij − δ̂wc
s
ij
)
+ (Bij −Bij)δ̂wssij
+Gij
(
x̂vsij − ŵcsij
)−Bijŵssij ∀ij ∈ E
where x̂vsij , ŵc
s
ij , ŵs
s
ij , δ̂xv
s
ij , δ̂wc
s
ij and δ̂ws
s
ij satisfy
the following constraints:
v̂si ∈ 〈vsi 〉MC−q , x̂vsij ∈ 〈x˜sij , v̂si 〉MC (32a)
ŵsij ∈ 〈vsi , vsj 〉MC (32b)
ŵcsij ∈ 〈ŵsij , ĉssij〉MC , ŵssij ∈ 〈ŵsij , ŝnsij〉MC (32c)
δ̂wc
s
ij ∈ 〈δsij , ŵcsij〉MC , δ̂ws
s
ij ∈ 〈δsij , ŵssij〉MC (32d)
ĉssij ≤ x˜sij −
(
1− cos(θu)
(θu)2
)
(θsij
2 + (x˜sij − 1)(θM )2) (32e)
x˜sij cos(θ
u) ≤ ĉssij ≤ x˜sij (32f)
ŝnsij ≤ cos(θu/2)θsij + x˜sij(sin(θu/2)− θu/2 cos(θu/2)) (32g)
+ (1− x˜sij)(cos(θu/2)θM + 1)
ŝnsij ≥ cos(θu/2)θsij − x˜sij(sin(θu/2)− θu/2 cos(θu/2)) (32h)
− (1− x˜sij)(cos(θu/2)θM + 1)
x˜sij sin(−θu) ≤ ŝnsij ≤ x˜sij sin(θu) (32i)
Finally, we relax constraint (11) into a second-order conic
constraint of the form ps2ij + q
s2
ij ≤ lsij vˆsi .
C. DC approximation
Within the expansion planning literature, the DC ap-
proximation is often used for designing power systems.
For comparison purposes, we develop a version of the
ORGDT problem based on the DC model in (33).
QDC(s) = {xs, τ s, ts, δs,γs, zps,u :
On/Off DC power flow equations:
psij ≤ −B˜ij
(
θsij + θ
M (1− x˜sij)
)
∀ij ∈ E , (33a)
psij ≥ −B˜ij
(
θsij − θM (1− x˜sij)
)
∀ij ∈ E , (33b)
G˜ij = (G¯ij −Gij)δsij +Gij ∀ij ∈ E , (33c)
B˜ij = (B¯ij −Bij)δsij +Bij ∀ij ∈ E , (33d)
psij + p
s
ji = 0, θ
s
ij = θ
s
i − θsj + φsij ∀ij ∈ E , (33e)
gpsi − lpsi =
∑
ij∈E
psij ∀i ∈ N , (33f)
Operational limits and topology constraints:
|psij | ≤ x˜sijTij ∀ij ∈ E , (33g)
|θsij | ≤ x˜sijθu + (1− x˜sij)θM ∀ij ∈ E , (33h)
− φuγsij ≤ φsij ≤ φuγsij ∀ij ∈ E , (33i)
xsij = t
s
ij ∀ij ∈ Ds (33j)
x˜sij = x
s
ij − τsij ≥ 0 ∀ij ∈ E (33k)
Generation and demand constraints ∀i ∈ N :
0 ≤ zpsi ≤ zpui ui, 0 ≤ gpsi ≤ gpui + zpsi , (33l)∑
i∈L
lpsi ≥ lpcr
∑
i∈L
dpi, (33m)∑
i∈N\L
lpsi ≥ lpncr
∑
i∈N\L
dpi (33n)
lpsi = yp
s
idpi; 0 ≤ ypsi ≤ 1, xs, τ s, ts ∈ {0, 1}}
5D. AC-feasibility formulation
It is important to note that the convex relaxations
introduced in section II-B and the DC approximation
of (33) might violate the nonconvex AC-equations de-
scribed in Eqs. (2)-(5), (11). In this section, we develop
a model for recovering primal feasible solutions to asses
the quality of these approximations. This model fixes all
the build decisions from the second stage solutions for
every disaster s ∈ S and solves for the feasibility of the
nonconvex equations based on a primal-dual interior point
method [19]. Formally, let (x˜s, ts, δs,γs, zps, zqs,u) be
the build decisions obtained in the first stage. Under the
DC model, at bus i, we assume that zqsi is equal to half
of the real power capacity, that is |zqsi | = zpsi/2. We
then minimize a weighted sum of the violations to the
resilience constraints which serves as a proxy to measure
the distance to AC feasibility.
p0 := min M (λ
p
cr + λ
q
cr) + λ
p
ncr + λ
q
ncr
s.t. Given (x˜s, ts, δs,γs, zps, zqs,u)
Constraints (2)− (6), (9)− (17), (22)− (25),
λpcr ≥
(
lpcr
∑
i∈L
dpi
)
−
∑
i∈L
lpsi , (34a)
λpncr ≥
lpncr ∑
i∈N\L
dpi
− ∑
i∈N\L
lpsi (34b)
λqcr ≥
(
lqcr
∑
i∈L
dqi
)
−
∑
i∈L
lqsi (34c)
λqncr ≥
lqncr ∑
i∈N\L
dqi
− ∑
i∈N\L
lqsi (34d)
λpcr, λ
q
cr, λ
p
ncr, λ
q
ncr ≥ 0 (34e)
where M is used to weight satisfaction of critical load and
and λpcr, λ
q
cr, λ
p
ncr, λ
q
ncr represent the load shed variables
on critical and non-critical load constraints (up to the
resilience criteria) as shown in constraints (34a)-(34d).
III. ALGORITHMS
In this section we discuss algorithms we use to solve
the ORGDT. The ORGDT is a two-stage Mixed-Integer
Quadratically Constrained Program (MIQCP) with a block
diagonal structure. In order to exploit this structure, we
generalize the scenario-based decomposition (SBD) tech-
niques of [7] to solve the ORGDT. In the remainder of this
paper, let PAC0 (S ′) denote the ORGDT with the scenario
set S ′ ⊆ S and σ denote the vector of construction
variables xij , τij , tij ,γij , δij for all ij ∈ E and ui, zpi
for all i ∈ N . SBD can be applied to ORGDT after the
following key observation:
Observation III.1. The second stage variables do not
appear in the objective function. Therefore any optimal
first stage solution based on a subset of the second stage
subproblems that is feasible for the remaining scenarios,
is an optimal solution for the original problem.
The SBD approach is outlined in Algorithm 1. At a high
level, Algorithm 1 solves problems with iteratively larger
sets of scenarios until a solution is obtained that is feasible
for all scenarios. The algorithm takes as input the set of
scenarios and an initial scenario to consider, S ′. Line 2
solves the ORGDT on S ′, where PAC0 (S ′) and σ∗ are used
to denote the problem and solution respectively. Line 3
then evaluates σ∗ on the remaining scenarios in S\S ′. The
function l : P ′(s, σ∗) → R+, is an infeasibility measure
that is 0 if the problem is feasible for scenario s, positive
otherwise. This function is implemented by solving the
feasibility subproblem reliability constraints, i.e. total and
critical demands are satisfied. We use a version of (34)
where M = 1 and the non convex constraints are replaced
with their convex counterparts. This function prices the
current solution over s ∈ S \ S ′. If all prices are 0,
then the algorithm terminates with solution σ∗ (lines 4-5).
Otherwise, the algorithm adds the scenario with the worst
infeasibility measure to S ′ (line 7).
Algorithm 1: Scenario-Based Decomposition
input: A set of disasters S and let S ′ = S0;
1 while S \ S ′ 6= ∅ do
2 σ∗ ← Solve PAC0 (S ′);
3 I ← 〈s1, s2 . . . s|S\S′|〉 s ∈ S \ S ′ :
l(PAC0 ′(si, σ∗)) ≥ l(PAC0 ′(si+1, σ∗));
4 if l(PAC0 ′(I(0), σ∗)) ≤ 0 then
5 return σ∗;
6 else
7 S ′ ← S ′ ∪ I(0);
8 return σ∗
Remark III.2. We observed that the LP-relaxation for
the ORGDT is very loose. To overcome this issue, we
augmented every iteration of Algorithm 1 with the previous
optimum objective value as a lower bound for the current
iteration.
Cutting-plane algorithm for quadratic constraints:
Even though optimization theory guarantees that the set of
convex inequalities in ORGDT can be solved efficiently,
several numerical experiments demonstrated that it was
challenging to solve even moderately sized problems using
state-of-the-art MIQCP solvers (CPLEX/Gurobi). Either
the solver convergence was very slow or it terminated with
“numerical trouble”. In order to circumvent this issue, we
adopted a cutting-plane approach. Let Pmiq be a general
MIQCP which contains the following quadratic constraint
(rotated second-order cone):
xTx ≤ yz, y ≥ 0, z ≥ 0, (x, y, z) ∈ R|x|+2 (35)
Algorithm 2 outlines the cutting plane procedure to
solve Pmiq . The key idea behind this algorithm is to solve
a finite sequence of MILPs to obtain an optimal solution
for the original MIQCP. Let Pmil, a MILP, represent the
6original problem without the quadratic constraints. The
solution in step 3 of Algorithm 2 is then guaranteed to
be a lower bound to Pmiq . This lower bound is tightened
further for every infeasible solution (step 4) by adding a
valid cutting plane (step 5). This cutting plane is valid as
it is an outer-approximation of the original feasible convex
set. This procedure is repeated until the solution obtained
is feasible (satisfies step 4), and hence optimal, for Pmiq .
Algorithm 2: Cutting plane algorithm for MIQCPs
1 Notation: f(x, y) = x
T x
y
2 Input: Pmil, tol > 0, L = ∅
3 xˆ, yˆ, zˆ ← Solve Pmil(x, y, z)
4 while xˆT xˆ > yˆzˆ + tol do
5 Augment L with the following cut:
f(xˆ, yˆ)+
∑|x|
i=1
∂f(x,y)
∂xi
(xi− xˆi)+ ∂f(x,y)∂y (y− yˆ) ≤ z
6 xˆ, yˆ, zˆ ← Solve (Pmil(x, y, z) ∪ L)
IV. CASE STUDY
In this section, we discuss three numerical studies for
the ORGDT based on the modified single area IEEE RTS-
96 system [20]. We first discuss the computational benefits
associated with using the SBD algorithm. We second
compare solutions based on the DC approximation with
solutions based on the QC relaxation. Finally, we examine
the benefits of FACTS and PST devices. All modeling was
done using JuMP [21] on a computer with 32 threads,
a 2.6GHz Intel 64 bit processor, 25.6MB L3 cache and
64GB of memory. Gurobi 6.5.2 was used for solving the
MIQCPs and MILPs (optimality gap 0.1%) and Knitro
9.1.0 was used for solving the nonlinear programs.
Test system We use a modified IEEE single-area RTS-
96 system that has 24 buses including 17 load buses, 38
transmission lines and 32 conventional generators [20].
The total installed capacity of the existing generators is
3405 MW. The total load in the system is 2850 MW.
We labeled 1740 MW as critical loads. The network was
spatially placed in an area of 4250 miles2. Since this test
system does not have the co-ordinate data for every bus,
we approximately evaluated them based on the lengths of
lines [20]. The admittance, impedance and apparent power
thermal limit values on lines are from the standard test
case. We assume that FACTS, PSTs and new generation
capacities, if chosen, can be built anywhere in the network.
The remaining parameters are outlined in Table I.
Scenario generation The damage scenarios are based
on line failure probabilities that follow a multivariate
Gaussian distribution with a mean placed at the center of
the network. A Bernoulli trial was applied to every line
for chosen percentiles (% damage) to generate the random
scenarios. Empirically, we observed that 20 scenarios were
sufficient to represent the features of the distribution.
TABLE I
PARAMETERS FOR THE TEST SYSTEM
cxij , c
t
ij , c
τ
ij $1.35m/mile, $5000/mile, $1000
cδij , c
γ
ij $50000, $50000
cui , c
zp
i $0.1m, $0.817m/MW
vli, v
u
i , φ
u, X¯ij 0.95, 1.05, 60◦, 0.5Xij
lpcr, lqcr, lpncr, lqncr 0.99, 0.99, 0.8, 0.8
Total no. of disaster scenarios 20
Critical load buses 1,5,8,11,13,14,15,16,18,19
New lines which can be built (1,10),(10,20),(19,24),(6,14),(20,21)
A. Computational Performance of SBD
Table II compares the computational time of SBD with
the computational time of solving the full model using a
MIQCP (Gurobi) solver. Here, we focus on the problem
where only new lines, hardened lines, and distributed
generations are available as design choices. On average,
SBD is 17x faster when θu = 15◦ and 26x faster when
θu = 45◦. We highlight in the 80% damage case that
after 20 hours the MIQCP solver could only provide a 7%
optimality gap, whereas SBD terminated with an optimal
solution after 12 minutes. It is important to note that when
FACTS and PST devices are included as design options,
the MIQCP solver fails to find any feasible solution after
10 hours of computation.
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF WALL TIME (SEC.) OF SBD AND MIQCP SOLVERS
ON PROBLEMS WITHOUT FACTS AND PST DEVICES. * INDICATES
THAT THE BEST GAP WAS 7%. THE FIRST COLUMN INDICATES THE
LEVEL OF DAMAGE. THE SECOND/FIFTH AND FOURTH/SEVENTH
COLUMNS INDICATE THE WALL TIMES OF SBD AND MIQCP,
RESPECTIVELY. THE THIRD AND SIXTH COLUMNS SHOW THE
NUMBER OF ITERATIONS FOR SBD
θu = 15◦ θu = 45◦
Damage SBD Iters Full SBD Iters Full
90% 634.8 3 5008.2 2419.6 4 13729.2
80% 303.7 5 1508.7 730.1 5 72886.3∗
70% 417.7 4 6566.9 485.1 4 2339.0
60% 188.3 2 8853.8 157.6 3 3537.5
50% 90.2 2 6156.7 53.1 1 9372.8
B. AC vs. DC power flow models
In this section we scale the loads of the model between
0.8 and 1.25 at .05 intervals. We define the gap between
the solutions based on the QC relaxation and solutions
based on the DC approximation as
ζ =
(
opt(PAC0 )− opt(PDC0 )
opt(PAC0 )
)
∗ 100
where opt(PACo ) and opt(PDCo ) are optimal upgrade
costs for QC relaxation and DC approximation models,
respectively. As shown in table III, DC-approximation-
based solutions are always lower bounds to solutions
based on QC relaxations. In the case of small phase angle
differences (θu = 15), the maximum and average ζ is at
the maximum damage case (90%). When the phase angle
differences are increased, the value of ζ increases dramat-
ically. This behavior in the solutions is not unexpected.
7DC approximations tend to perform poorly when there are
large phase angle differences as the assumptions behind
the approximation no longer hold. In Figure 1, we expand
the results of the 90% damage row of Table III and see
how the DC approximation consistently under estimates
the design costs.
TABLE III
EACH ROW DESCRIBES THE AVERAGE, MIN, AND MAX ζ ACROSS
LOAD SCALING VALUES BETWEEN 0.8 AND 1.25X FOR A SPECIFIED
DAMAGE LEVEL.
θu = 15◦ θu = 45◦
Dam. avg min max avg min max
gap (%) gap (%) gap (%) gap (%) gap (%) gap (%)
90% 9.7 0 35.4 22.4 5.5 47.3
80% 9.2 0 25.3 22.1 11.7 37.6
70% 7.0 0 29.3 24.0 15.4 55.7
60% 5.6 0 29.4 24.9 7.4 43.1
50% 2.1 0 11.3 35.9 0 53.1
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Fig. 1. Comparison of total upgrade cost for the QC relaxation with the
DC approximation
AC feasibility analysis ζ is not the only metric for
comparing the solutions based on the DC and QC models.
It is also important to understand distance to AC feasibility
(section II-D) in each scenario. For a given scenario s, we
calculate the percent apparent-load shed with:
µ =

√
(λ
p
cr)2 + (λ
q
cr)2√(∑
i∈L dpi
)2 + (∑i∈L dqi
)2 ,
√
(λ
p
ncr)2 + (λ
q
ncr)2√√√√(∑
i∈N\L dpi
)2
+
(∑
i∈N\L dqi
)2
×100
for critical and noncritical loads, respectively.
Table IV summarizes the average and maximum µ
for each scenario for the solution found with the DC
approximation for a load scale of 1.0. The QC relaxation is
tight and no (additional) load shedding is required. Though
the DC approximation is considered a good approximation
when phase angle differences are small, we still observe
load sheds of up to 3.7% of critical loads and 6.7% of
non-critical loads in the maximum damage case. Again,
the DC approximation’s performance degrades further for
larger phase angle differences with a maximum µ of 4.5%
(critical) and 9.4% (non-critical). Figure 2 further expands
on µ for each scenario in the 90% damage case.
To summarize, OGRDT solutions based on the DC
approximation perform reasonable well only on systems
with small phase angle differences and limited damage.
When the grid is damaged heavily, DC approximation
performs poorly, even at smaller θu values. At larger θu
values, the DC approximation drastically under approxi-
mates the required upgrades, and results in solutions that
severely violate resilience criteria based on load shedding.
However, these issues can be addressed by applying AC
relaxations in lue of DC approximations.
TABLE IV
AVERAGE AND MAXIMUM µ (CRITICAL, NON-CRITICAL) FOR DC
SOLUTIONS AND A LOAD SCALE OF 1.0.
θu = 15◦ θu = 45◦
Damage avg. µ max. µ avg. µ max µ
90% 0.3, 0.7 3.7, 6.7 0.5, 1.6 4.5, 8.9
80% 0.1, 1.2 0.3, 7.3 0.2, 3.0 1.7, 9.2
70% 0.1, 0.1 0.3, 2.7 0.15, 2.5 0.9, 9.4
60% 0.1, 0.1 0.3, 0.2 0.13, 2.4 0.3, 9.0
50% 0, 0 0, 0.03 0, 1.8 0, 7.5
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Fig. 2. Values of µ for the QC relaxation and DC approximation for
90% damage scenarios when the load scale is 1.0.
C. Benefits of FACTS and PST devices
In this section, we summarize the benefits of includ-
ing FACTS and PST device options in the ORGDT. To
quantify the benefits, we define the following:
ψ =
(
opt(PAC0 )− opt(PAC−dev0 )
opt(PAC0 )
)
× 100
FACTS devices Table V summarizes the benefits of in-
cluding FACTS devices to achieve advantages of operating
transmission grids at larger θu values without the stability
issues. Overall, we observe that savings is a much as
17.2% when θu = 15◦. The benefit of FACTS devices is
smaller when θu is larger, since the operating points are
less congested and the need for such devices is reduced.
We use Figure 3 to expand on ψ for the 90% damage
case.
TABLE V
AVERAGE AND MAXIMUM (PARENTHESIS INDICATE LOAD SCALE
VALUE FOR THE MAX) ψ ACROSS LOAD SCALES BETWEEN 0.8 AND
1.25 WHEN FACTS DEVICES ARE INCLUDED IN THE OGRDT.
θu = 15◦ θu = 45◦
Damage avg. ψ max. ψ avg. ψ max. ψ
90% 9.3 31.6 (1.25) 5.6 20.7 (1.25)
80% 9.6 31.3 (1.2) 5.5 20.2 (1.25)
70% 10.5 28.0 (1.2) 4.5 14.6 (1.25)
60% 10.3 29.7 (1.2) 4.6 28.0 (1.25)
50% 17.2 33.2 (1.2) 11.8 29.4 (1.25)
In Figure 3, it is interesting to note the (sometimes) non-
increasing trend in ψ as load scale increases. Intuitively,
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Fig. 3. Comparison of total upgrade costs and ψ for optimal upgrade
solutions with and without FACTS devices.
this indicates that upgrades required for certain load scales
are also sufficient for further increases in load. More im-
portantly, perhaps, the OGRDT solution with and without
FACTS devices is sometimes identical. This phenomena
indicates that at certain load scales, FACTS devices cannot
eliminate the need for other upgrades (line hardening, new
lines, etc.) and once those upgrades are installed, the need
for FACTS devices is eliminated. Of course, as the load
scale increases, FACTS devices are once again required.
PST devices Generally speaking, we only found PST
devices to be of benefit when the network is congested and
has larger load scales. Under the 90% damage cases, θu =
15◦ and load scales greater than 1.20, we found solutions
with savings of around 10%. Though the improvement in
ψ when PSTs are included is not as impressive as when
FACTS devices are included, we believe that the savings
are non trival when considering large-scale grids.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we formulated, modeled, and developed a
model of ORGDT. Our contributions include a comparison
of solutions to the ORGDT with the DC approximation
and the QC relaxation that demonstrates the necessity of
AC power flow modeling in resilience studies. We also
developed an approach for recovering fully AC feasible
solutions that indicate that solutions based on the QC
relaxation tend to be tight in practice. Finally, we have
also shown that a small set of strategically located PST
and FACTS devices as design options can reduce the
need for other design considerations like line hardening
or distributed generation.
There remain a number of interesting future directions
for work in this area. First, it will be important to scale
the approaches of the paper to larger, more realistic
transmission grids. An important idea in this area is to
limit the upgrades to those that are deemed practical by
subject matter experts. Second, it will be important to
introduce tighter and improved models of FACTS and PST
devices (such as continuous set points). Finally, it will
be interesting to consider= approaches for using FACTS
and PST devices to improve the restoration process of
transmission grids, as seen in [22].
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